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Abstract
There is a debate among search theorists as to whether search exploits a memory for rejected distractors. We 
addressed this question by monitoring eye movements and explicitly marking objects visited by gaze during 
search. If search is memoryless, markers might be used to reduce distractor reinspections and improve search 
efficiency, relative to a no-marking baseline. However, if search already uses distractor memory, there should be 
no differences between marking and no-marking conditions. In four experiments, with stimuli ranging from Os and 
Qs to realistic scenes, two consistent data patterns emerged: (1) Marking rejected distractors produced no 
systematic benefit for search efficiency, as measured by reinspections, reaction times, or errors, and (2) distractor 
reinspection rates were, overall, extremely low. These results suggest that search uses a memory for rejected 
distractors, at least in those many real-world search tasks in which gaze is free to move.
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Recent work has documented several relationships be-
tween visual search, the task of detecting a target among 
distractors, and various forms of memory. There is now 
good evidence suggesting that memory for previous target 
locations exists and can be used across search episodes 
(Chun & Nakayama, 2000; Shore & Klein, 2000). How-
ever, a question currently under debate concerns whether 
memory for previously inspected and rejected distractor 
locations can also be used to prevent the occurrence of dis-
tractor reinspections within a given search episode. Such a 
distractor memory has long been assumed by popular the-
ories of search (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 1994). 
The clearest expression of this belief is the prediction of 
a 2:1 ratio of linear target-absent to target-present search 
slopes by serial exhaustive search models—a prediction 
requiring a record of rejected distractor locations. This 
widely held assumption, however, has been challenged 
by Horowitz and Wolfe (1998), who showed that the ran-
dom relocation of objects in a search task did not impair 
search efficiency, relative to when the objects remained 
stationary. Horowitz and Wolfe (1998) concluded from 
this finding that the search process is amnesic and does 
not use memory for rejected distractors (but see Dickin-
son & Zelinsky, 2002, and Mühlenen, Müller, & Müller, 
2003, for alternative explanations).
Although subsequent investigations (Horowitz & Wolfe, 
2001, 2003; Woodman, Vogel, & Luck, 2001) have sup-
ported the conclusion that search does not use memory, 
other evidence has accumulated that supports the oppo-
site conclusion (Kristjánsson, 2000; Müller & Mühlenen, 
2000). Many of the researchers arguing for the existence 
of distractor memory have used eye movement paradigms 
to make their case (Aks, Zelinsky, & Sprott, 2002; Mc-
Carley, Wang, Kramer, Irwin, & Peterson, 2003). For ex-
ample, Klein and MacInnes (1999) found a bias against 
directing saccades to distractor locations visited by gaze 
within the last two fixations, a pattern that they interpreted 
as evidence for distractor memory. An eye movement par-
adigm also allows one to quantify distractor memory use 
in terms of a proportion of rejected distractors that are 
refixated during search. Studies in which this method has 
been used have shown that the observed refixation rate 
is lower than the rate expected for a memoryless model, 
again suggesting that distractor memory is used during a 
search task (Gilchrist & Harvey, 2000; Peterson, Kramer, 
Wang, Irwin, & McCarley, 2001).
Using the World as an External Memory
We introduce a methodology that builds on earlier re-
fixation-based assessments of memory during search. 
Our technique provides observers with a visible record 
of fixated objects by making gaze-contingent changes 
to the search display. For example, if a salient red box is 
drawn around a search object each time gaze shifts away 
(Figure 1), the accumulation of these markers during a 
search trial will create a sort of enduring external memory 
(O’Regan, 1992) of the observer’s search history. We com-
pared several of these marking conditions with no-marking 
baselines to determine whether differences exist in search 
efficiency or distractor refixation rate. If there exists no 
internal memory for rejected search distractors, we should 
find more distractor refixations in the no-marking condi-
tion, as compared with conditions in which markers are 
externally available to assist search. However, if observ-
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There is a debate among search theorists as to whether search exploits a memory for rejected 
distractors. We addressed this question by monitoring eye movements and explicitly marking objects 
visited by gaze during search. If search is memoryless, markers might be used to reduce distractor rein-
spections and improve search efficiency, relative to a no-marking baseline. However, if search already 
uses distractor memory, there should be no differences between marking and no-marking conditions. 
In four experiments, with stimuli ranging from Os and Qs to realistic scenes, two consistent data pat-
terns emerged: (1) Marking rejected distractors produced no systematic benefit for search efficiency, 
as measured by reinspections, reaction times, or errors, and (2) distractor reinspection rates were, 
overall, extremely low. These results suggest that search uses a memory for rejected distractors, at 
least in those many real-world search tasks in which gaze is free to move.
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ers have a good internal memory for distractors and use 
it to avoid reinspecting objects, external markers will be 
redundant and should, therefore, not improve search ef-
ficiency or lower distractor refixation rates. We also com-
pared refixation rates with a memoryless random fixation 
model. Here, we predicted that if observers were using 
either an internal or an external distractor memory during 
search, the observed refixation rates should be lower than 
those generated by the memoryless model.
METHOD
Because one’s reliance on distractor memory might reasonably 
vary with the difficulty of the search task, we used four very differ-
ent stimulus sets in this study. The target in Experiment 1 was an O 
embedded in rotated Q-like distractors. In Experiment 2, observers 
were asked to search for a real-world object in an array of object 
distractors. Experiment 3 was a Where’s Waldo search task, and Ex-
periment 4 had observers search for a tank target in fully realistic 
landscape scenes. The methodological details common to all four 
experiments are described below; details specific to each experiment 
are described in the Appendix.
Participants
In both Experiments 1 and 2, 12 observers were tested; in both 
Experiments 3 and 4, 10 observers were used. No observer partici-
pated in more than one experiment, and all had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision.
Apparatus
Eye movement and manual data were collected using the  EyeLink II 
eye-tracking system (SR Research). Eye position was sampled at 
500 Hz, the system’s spatial resolution was estimated to be 0.2º, and 
changes in gaze position were available to the computer controlling 
the display within 8 msec. Search displays subtended 27º  20º 
(800  600 pixels) and were presented on a 19-in. CRT monitor at 
a refresh rate of 100 Hz. Head position and viewing distance were 
fixed with a chinrest, and all responses were made with a GamePad 
controller attached to the computer’s USB port. Judgments were 
made with the left and right index-finger triggers; trials were initi-
ated with a button operated by the left thumb.
Procedure
The displays in Experiments 1 and 2 consisted of discrete objects 
appearing on a black background; the displays in Experiments 3 
and 4 consisted of scenes that could not be easily decomposed into 
discrete objects. These two different display types required differ-
ent methods of marking fixated locations. In the discrete-object 
displays, each object was centered in an invisible bounding circle 
that was used to assign a fixation to an object. Fixated objects were 
tagged by replacing them with a marked version of the object, and 
fixated objects were marked only if gaze duration within the bound-
ing circle exceeded a minimum fixation threshold (see the Appen-
dix for details). Objects were marked after gaze moved outside of 
the bounding circle, with each marker remaining visible for the du-
ration of the trial. In the scene-based search tasks, fixated locations 
were marked if the distance between the current fixation and the 
last marked fixation exceeded a minimum distance threshold and 
a minimum fixation duration criterion was satisfied. The markers 
Time
Figure 1. A schematized illustration of gaze-contingent explicit marking. The cartoon eye in each 
panel represents an observer’s gaze position. Note that marking occurs as gaze shifts to a new display 
object.
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used in these experiments were semitransparent color overlays (1º 
squares) centered on the location of the fixation. Figure 1 illustrates 
the marking process; approximations of marked and unmarked dis-
plays are shown in Figure 2 for each experiment.
Search displays remained visible until a target-present or target-
absent response. Marking and no-marking trials were blocked and 
counterbalanced across participants; target condition (present or ab-
sent) was interleaved. Practice trials preceded each block of trials. 
Participants were asked to respond as quickly as possible without 
sacrificing accuracy, and were told that the markers would provide 
a valid history of their fixated objects and might therefore prove 
useful to their search.
RESULTS
Reinspection Analysis
Before we could derive the distractor reinspection rate, 
we first had to convert fixations into inspections in order 
to deal with cases in which objects were multiply fixated 
within a single viewing. For Experiments 1 and 2, this in-
volved collapsing sequential fixations falling within the 
same bounding circle into a single inspection. In the rare 
event that a fixation did not fall within a bounding circle, 
it was assigned to the nearest object and treated as any 
other fixation for the purpose of calculating an inspection. 
Because the displays in Experiments 3 and 4 were scenes, 
rather than discrete-object arrays, we subdivided each dis-
play into a 48-cell grid of 100  100 pixel squares (3.4º  
3.3º) and then collapsed sequential fixations falling within 
the same cell into a single inspection. Reinspections were 
defined as any inspections falling within a previously in-
spected grid location. We excluded immediate refixations 
from these analyses, since the cause of these refixations 
has been attributed to the incomplete processing of ob-
jects (Hooge & Erkelens, 1998) and, therefore, cannot be 
unambiguously attributed to memory failure.
Basic search data, including the number of inspections 
for all four experiments, are shown in Table 1. Turning 
first to the gaze inspection data, two general patterns are 
clear. First, the number of inspections varied considerably 
across our search tasks, ranging from 36 in Experiment 1 
to 2.5 in Experiment 2. Second, in only two cases (out of 
12 comparisons) was a significant difference observed 
between the marking and the no-marking conditions (all 
other ps  .05).
Both of these patterns can also be seen in the reinspec-
tion data (Figure 3; solid bars). Reinspection rates in the 
target-present trials (top) were uniformly low. More-
A B
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Figure 2. Examples of search stimuli from Experiments 1–4. The left side of each panel illustrates display 
conditions in a no-marking trial or prior to the addition of any markers in a marking trial (i.e., at the start 
of the trial); the right half illustrates display conditions after several fixations during marking trials. Shown 
are representations of the O search task (A, schematic), the object search task (B), the Where’s Waldo task 
(C, schematized markers), and the tank search task (D, schematized markers). Note that the actual stimuli 
were in color. See the Appendix for details regarding the specific marking criteria and display conditions 
used in each experiment.
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over, except for a small (2%) marker benefit in the Ex-
periment 1 35 set size data [t(11)  5.60, p  .001] 
and a small (2%) marker cost in the Experiment 4 data 
[t(11)  3.98, p  .003], reinspection rates did not dif-
fer between the marking and the no-marking conditions 
( ps  .05). Similar patterns were observed in the target-
absent reinspection data (bottom). Although reinspections 
were more common in the target-absent data, relative to 
the target-present data, as would be expected given the 
greater number of inspections made during target-absent 
trials (Table 1), no marker benefits were found in Experi-
ments 2–4 ( ps  .05).
The target-absent data from Experiment 1 were more 
mixed. Here, we found a small (approximately 5%) but 
significant main effect of marking [F(1,11)  26.41, p  
.05]. However, given the size of this effect and its failure to 
interact with set size [F(2,22)  0.84, p  .05], we attri-
bute these differences to the external markers’ preventing 
the one or two terminal reinspections that often precede 
an exhaustive target-absent search response and do not 
take them as evidence for memory failure. Note also that 
reinspections decreased slightly with increasing set size 
[F(2,22)  5.80, p  .05]. Although this trend may sug-
gest that search is more amnesic at smaller set sizes, we 
think that it is more likely that the larger amplitude sac-
cades required by sparser displays resulted in greater sac-
cade error and the occasional inadvertent reinspection of 
distractors. Taken together, the overall patterns of results 
from all four experiments suggest that the observers had 
an internal representation of their search history and that 
this memory was nearly as effective as external markers 
in preventing distractor reinspections.
The reinspection rates shown in Figure 3 are clearly 
low, but are they lower than what would be expected from 
chance? We addressed this question by comparing the be-
havioral reinspection rates with the rates predicted by a 
memoryless search model. Simulations were conducted 
on an observer-by-observer and trial-by-trial basis, with 
the number of behavioral inspections on a given trial (n) 
determining the number of search objects selected by the 
model. For each trial, the model therefore randomly se-
lected, with replacement and without regard for display 
characteristics, n “fixations” from the set of locations 
corresponding to object positions in the display.1 Rein-
spections occurred whenever the model selected the same 
object more than once during a trial.2
These simulated reinspection rates (hatched bars) are 
plotted alongside the behavioral rates in Figure 3. Be-
havioral reinspection rates in Experiments 3 and 4 and 
all three of the set size conditions in Experiment 1 were 
much lower than what would be expected from a memory-
less search model in both the target-present and the target-
absent data ( ps  .05). Target-present reinspection rates 
in Experiment 2 were uninterpretable, due to the small 
number of fixations accompanying search in that condi-
tion; however, a small but significant difference was found 
in the target-absent data [t(11)  5.40, p  .001]. These 
below-chance reinspection rates provide converging evi-
dence for the use of distractor memory during search. If 
the observers had not used their distractor memory in the 
no-marking condition, or if they had ignored the markers 
in the marking condition, their reinspection rates should 
have been at chance, as defined by the memoryless model. 
This was clearly not the case.
Manual Data
We know from the eye data analyses that reinspec-
tion rates did not differ substantially between the mark-
ing and the no-marking search conditions, but were there 
differences in overall search efficiency? Table 1 shows 
the reaction time (RT) and error data from both display 
conditions, with significant differences between marking 
and no-marking data indicated by an asterisk. Of these 24 
comparisons, only 1 produced a significant marking dif-
ference, and this difference described a marker cost, rather 
than a benefit.3 Moreover, search slopes in the Experi-
ment 1 target-present (absent) data were 120 (288) msec/
object in the marking condition and 117 (292) msec/object 
in the no-marking condition, not significant differences 
( ps  .05). Consistent with the reinspection analyses, 
having visible markers available produced no evidence 
for improvement in search efficiency.
One potential concern raised by the marking paradigm 
is that the marker onsets might be capturing the observ-
ers’ attention and, therefore, interfering with their search. 
It might be the case that a marker benefit was being offset 
by a distracting effect of the marker. To look for such a 
trade-off, we analyzed the frequency of immediate rein-
Table 1
Number of Inspections, Reaction Times (in Milliseconds), and 
Error Rates for Experiments 1–4
Present Absent
Experiment  Marking  No Marking  Marking  No Marking
Number of Inspections
1   (7)†  5.2  5.0  9.2  9.6
1 (21) 12.8 12.1 22.5 *24.5*
1 (35) 18.0 18.1 34.1 36.0
2  2.5 * 3.1*  6.0  5.8
3  8.4  8.8 27.3 26.1
4‡  4.7  4.4 19.1 17.3
Reaction Time
1   (7)† 2,296 2,123  3,183  3,297
1 (21) 4,178 3,909  7,458  7,869
1 (35) 5,659 5,395 11,237 11,480
2 1,118 1,217  1,663  1,606
3 3,139 3,197  9,264  8,364
4‡ 2,036 1,823  6,891  5,941
Percentage of Errors
1   (7)†  2.5  2.5 0.6 0.8
1 (21) 18.6 13.9 0.3 0.6
1 (35) 18.9 18.6 0.6 0.3
2  7.2  6.7 0.8 1.9
3  5.8 11.2 2.1 1.4
4‡ 12.9 * 5.4* 1.3 2.5
Note—Initial fixations are not included in the inspection data. *Significant 
differences ( p  .05, two-tailed t test) between the marking and the no-
marking conditions. †The numbers 7, 21, and 35 refer to the set sizes 
in Experiment 1. ‡Target-present data for Experiment 4 represent the 
mean of both the large and the small target types.
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spections in our data. If marker onsets were capturing 
attention in our tasks, one would expect frequent and im-
mediate gaze shifts back to the most recently marked ob-
ject (Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, Irwin, & Zelinsky, 1999). 
Comparing the frequency of immediate reinspections in 
the marking and the no-marking conditions revealed no 
evidence for this hypothesis. Only in the O-Q task was a 
significant difference observed [t(11)  4.87, p  .05], 
but this difference was in the opposite direction of what 
would be predicted from an attention capture effect (i.e., 
4.3% immediate reinspections without a marker, 3.1% 
immediate reinspections with a marker). No other differ-
ences approached significance, suggesting that the scar-
city of marker effects on search efficiency was probably 
not caused by marker benefits being negated by marker 
onset costs.4
DISCUSSION
Many of our day-to-day search tasks take place in com-
plex environments, with numerous potential locations re-
quiring inspection. Clearly, using memory of one’s search 
history could facilitate many of these searches, particu-
larly when the target of the search is not present. In this 
study, we introduced a gaze-contingent paradigm to ex-
plicitly manipulate the availability of information about 
previously fixated search distractors. The results of four 
experiments converged on a single conclusion: Providing 
a visible record of one’s search history had little or no im-
pact on either search efficiency or reinspection frequency. 
Moreover, distractor reinspections were found to be quite 
infrequent and clearly below chance in both object-based 















































































Figure 3. Proportions of distractor reinspections under marking (white bars) and 
no-marking (gray bars) conditions for the O (O-7, O-21, and O-35 refer to the three 
set sizes), object, Waldo, and tank search tasks. Hatched bars show the corresponding 
simulated reinspection rates from our memoryless model. Target-present data are 
shown in panel A, and target-absent data are shown in panel B. Note that we report 
simulated data for both the marking and the no-marking conditions. Although this 
manipulation would not be expected to affect a memoryless model, because our simu-
lations were based on the total number of inspections in the behavioral data, slight 
differences in the behavioral inspection rate between the marking and the no-marking 
conditions (see Table 1) resulted in slightly different simulation results.
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What About Memoryless Search?
Our findings have important implications for the ques-
tion of whether distractor memory is used during search. 
Recent years have seen mounting evidence arguing 
against Horowitz and Wolfe’s (1998) claim that search 
has no memory (Aks et al., 2002; Gilchrist & Harvey, 
2000; Kristjánsson, 2000; McCarley et al., 2003; Mül-
ler & Mühlenen, 2000; Peterson et al., 2001). The pres-
ent data add to this growing chorus of studies by showing 
no meaningful benefit to search from a valid and readily 
available external memory of rejected distractors. Rather 
than search being memoryless, our data suggest the op-
posite conclusion: that a nearly perfect memory exists for 
where one has searched and that this memory is used opti-
mally to avoid distractor reinspections. However, our data 
do not require the representation of many discrete rejected 
distractors or location tags, constructs traditionally asso-
ciated with distractor memory. We believe that distractor 
memory might, instead, take the form of a more abstracted 
search plan (see Peterson, Beck, & Vomela, 2004, for a 
similar proposal). If observers are able to represent the 
path that they follow during their search, it follows that 
they should demonstrate evidence for distractor memory 
well beyond the memory capacity limits suggested by re-
cent studies (McCarley et al., 2003; Peterson et al., 2001). 
Future work will explore this possibility.
Regardless of its form, it appears that our observers uti-
lized their internal representations sufficiently well that 
the provision of external markers was informationally re-
dundant and not helpful to their search. The fact that this 
pattern was observed across four search tasks that varied 
markedly in difficulty and stimulus complexity makes 
this finding all the more compelling. Our finding is also 
consistent with recent work on visual neglect in which 
a cancellation test was used (Wojciulik, Rorden, Clarke, 
Husain, & Driver, 2004). The fact that patients showed 
marker benefits in their neglected hemifield suggests that 
the normally high-functioning internal marking system 
may malfunction in people with neglect. Finally, although 
our data do not speak to the question of whether distractor 
memory is used in the absence of eye movements, given 
that eye movements are made in the vast majority of real-
world search tasks and that these eye movements reflect 
distractor memory, the conclusion follows that this mem-
ory is used during most of our day-to-day search tasks. 
This suggests that cases in which distractor memory is 
not used to facilitate search are more likely the exception, 
rather than the rule.
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NOTES
1. In the case of the scene-based experiments, the set of display posi-
tions eligible for fixation corresponded to the same 48 grid cells used 
to characterize the behavioral reinspection rates. To prevent the model 
from sampling improbable scene regions, the set of eligible grid cells 
was further constrained to those regions fixated by the observer in the 
corresponding behavioral data.
2. Note that the model was prevented from immediately resampling 
objects (i.e., selecting the same object on fixation i  1 as on fixation i). 
As in the behavioral data, immediate refixations, cases in which an ob-
ject was selected on fixation i, then reselected on fixation i  2, were 
also excluded from the simulated data.
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3. Further analysis of these Experiment 4 data revealed that misses 
were higher in the marking condition only for small targets [24.2% vs. 
10%; t(9)  2.63, p  .05]; miss rates for the large targets were substan-
tially lower and not significantly different (1.7% vs. 1.5%). We speculate 
that the markers were occasionally covering small targets and that this 
was contributing to the higher miss rate.
4. In a preliminary experiment investigating the possibility of marker 
onset costs, we also compared data from a marker onset condition with 
those from a marker offset condition in an O-Q search task (Dickinson, 
Chen, & Zelinsky, 2003). The procedure in the onset condition was similar 
to that described in the present Experiment 2, except for the markers being 
red boxes surrounding fixated objects. The offset condition presented a 
search display in which every object was initially surrounded by a red box. 
Objects were then marked by having this box disappear when gaze shifted 
away from a fixated object. Analyses of these data revealed no systematic 
differences between onset and offset conditions in either RTs or distractor 
refixations, further supporting our conclusion that marker onsets were not 
capturing attention and, thereby, introducing a cost.
APPENDIX
Experiment 1
The target was an O and the distractors were Q-like objects oriented at 0º, 90º, 180º, and 270º. The Os sub-
tended 0.61º  0.61º, and the “tail” of the distractors subtended 0.07º  0.07º. The objects were arranged ran-
domly, with a minimum center-to-center object spacing of 2.87º and a minimum display center to object center 
spacing of 2.84º. Marking consisted of replacing gray unmarked objects with bright pink versions of the same 
objects, provided that gaze remained for at least 80 msec within an object’s 2.8º bounding circle.
There were 600 trials per observer, evenly divided into two display conditions (marking and no-marking), two 
target conditions (present and absent), and set sizes ranging from 7 to 35 objects. Marking and no-marking trials 
were completed on separate days, and 32 practice trials preceded each condition.
Experiment 2
Fifty children’s toys were selected from the HEMERA object database (Hemera Technologies); set size 
was fixed at 14 objects. The minimum center-to-center distance between objects was 3.38º, and the minimum 
distance from the display’s center to the center of any object was 2.84º. Except for these constraints, object 
placement in the display was random. All the objects could fit inside a 2.36º  2.36º bounding box and were 
presented in color against a black background. Markers were red square frames that subtended 3.38º  3.38º 
and were 0.17º thick. Marking required that gaze enter a 3.4º bounding circle surrounding an object and remain 
in this region for at least 100 msec.
A target object was designated before each trial (1 sec), followed by a search display that remained visible 
until the response. Target objects were not reused within a display condition; distractors were selected randomly 
from the remaining set of 49 objects. There was a 2:1 ratio of absent to present trials per condition, and there 
were 24 practice trials.
Experiment 3
Displays were color images taken from Where’s Waldo picture books. Twenty-four target-absent scenes were 
created by selectively scanning and cropping picture book images. Target-present scenes were created by seg-
menting the Waldo target and inserting it into the target-absent images, using Adobe Photoshop Version 7.1. 
To randomize target placement, displays were divided into a 16-cell grid, and targets were assigned with equal 
frequency to each cell. Targets were scaled to look correct in each image, with target size averaging 3.6º  1.7º. 
Markers were 1º semitransparent purple squares. Locations were marked if a fixation exceeded 200 msec in 
duration and was at least 1º from the last marked location.
Each of the 24 scenes appeared four times (twice in each display condition), for a total of 96 trials, divided 
evenly between present and absent conditions. Note that scene and target presence were decorrelated so as to 
prevent anticipatory responses upon the second viewing of a given scene. Accuracy feedback was provided after 
every trial, and the observers were familiarized with the target before the experiment. There were 16 practice 
trials.
Experiment 4
Displays were 24 landscape scenes modified from the “Search 2” image database (Toet, Bijl, Kooi, & Valeton, 
1998). Target-present trials were created by inserting a large (2º  1.4º) or a small (1º  0.7º) tank target into 
these scenes, with both target types appearing equally often in the right or left half of the display. The marker was 
a red semitransparent square. All other procedural and design details were the same as those in Experiment 3.
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